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Facing Disruption: The Cinema Value Chain in the Digital Age 
 
Elisa Salvador, Jean-Paul Simon, Pierre-Jean Benghozi 
 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs) have attracted growing attention in the grey and 
scientific literatures since the turn of the millennium (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Ó 
Cinnéide 2005; UNCTAD 2010). Government reports on strategy are appearing2 and 
academics are focusing on various aspects of CCI growth and development from different 
perspectives (see, e.g., Benghozi and Lyubareva 2014; Benghozi and Salvador 2015, 2016; 
Caves 2000; Crane et al. 2016; Flew 2012; Florida 2002; Lazzeretti 2013; Moreau and Sagot-
Duvauroux 2012; Poettschacher 2005; Scott 2006; Taylor and Littleton 2016). Also, special 
issues of scientific journals are appearing regularly,3 attesting to the increased importance of 
these industries. 
One of the main issues of CCIs in the digital age is their ambiguous status (industrial, 
technical and cultural), which makes them difficult to define and classify.4 One aspect not yet 
fully investigated is the consequences of the growing influence of innovation and technology, 
especially following the digital revolution (Granados et al. 2017; Karimi and Walter 2015; 
Protogerou et al. 2017). This is surprising given the clear link between creativity and 
innovation (Sarooghi et al. 2015). It is of pivotal importance because the competition has 
accelerated since the mainstream adoption of the Internet, thus highlighting a strengthening of 
the link between technology and competition since the mid-1990s (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 
2008). According to Abbasi et al. (2017), “innovation and creativity have become broadly 
used terms in many national development strategies that can lead to growth” (p. 41). 
Nevertheless, CCI companies are known for their limited investment in innovation and 
research and development (R&D).5 Academics and consultants tend to agree that most R&D 
and technological innovation takes place outside CCIs and is supported by outsiders, mainly 
industries in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. 
The present article is aimed at portraying the new kind of interaction between 
technology, technology players, and content creation and production. Digitization has ushered 
in a new role for technology and R&D that has led to a shift in the centre of gravity of the 
value chain. More specifically, our study investigates the way that disruptive technologies are 
challenging the traditional equilibrium and the value chain of a specific industry historically 
impacted by technological evolution, namely cinema. Technological innovation, once limited 
to a subsegment of the “technical industries”6 of cinema, has gained traction vis-à-vis the 
traditional creation of content. The massive global effects of technology are usually examined 
with no consideration given to how technologies transform the cinema value chain and 
organization and play a disruptive role (Christensen 1997). The aim of our study is to 
highlight this aspect, which is of pivotal importance in a technology-oriented industry such as 
cinema and in CCIs in general, where technology is not included in the management 
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literature. Looking at specific technological impacts at the micro level instead of focusing on 
massive macro effects helps to fill a gap in the literature and foster improvements in public 
policies for the cinema industry in particular and CCIs in general. 
The case of cinema may shed some light on these issues. From the start, cinema has 
had an important technological component and has relied on a number of crucial 
technological breakthroughs. Neal et al. (2012) argue that a series of technological inventions, 
combined to bring about the projection of moving pictures, created the film industry. New 
players, usually specialized technological suppliers (STSs), are building their position by 
using their technological expertise to serve the creative dimension of cultural works. 
Shedding light on one of the most technology-based CCIs is a first step in extending the 
analysis to other CCIs that are more or less close to the cinema. 
The specific focus on the cinema industry is also justified by the fact that ICT 
companies have brought about a differentiated evolution: the shooting modalities are reduced, 
but the fixed costs of infrastructure, postproduction and distribution are increased. Hence, the 
economic balance in the value chain is potentially shifting to players controlling infrastructure 
such as “over the top” services (e.g., Netflix), telecommunication companies and cable 
operators. 
This article reports on an in-depth investigation of the cinema industry using different 
sources: desk research, a review of the grey and scientific literature in this field, and meetings 
with experts and industry participants.7 Data were collected over the period March to 
November 2014 and updated through interviews conducted in March and April 2018. The 
analysis is grounded in several case studies (see Table 1). The evidence collected is used to 
call attention to the role of new actors and the way that technological innovation disrupts the 
ecosystem and legacy value chain, thus introducing a balance between legacy actors and new 
technological players. These features have brought about a reconfiguration of the traditional 
business ecosystem. By the same token, they call into question the current role of public 
intervention in a digital environment. 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
The article is structured as follows. First we present an overview of the cinema 
industry and the specificities of its disruption. Then we identify the technological innovation 
models at work, from those incrementally enhanced by technology to full-scale disruptive 
models, with particular attention to the case of Netflix. In the next section we focus on the 
changing structure of the cinema industry, from project-based to business-based, and then 
illustrate the reconfiguration of the business ecosystem resulting from the active role played 
by new intermediaries. In the concluding section we ask whether there is a need for a new set 
of policies to grapple with these major changes. 
 
 
1. The Consequences of “Disruption” in Cinema: Redesigning the Industry? 
 
One of the features of the cinema industry is that each creative project turns out to be an 
innovative and prototype project. Companies consider R&D more as related to investments in 
projects and content than as related directly to the design and innovation of processes, 
infrastructure and devices. Therefore, innovative activity is usually hidden within the 
project’s production budget. However, the growing role of some of the technological elements 
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(shooting, visual effects) combined with the (relative) significance of some of a film’s budget 
opens up an opportunity for funding development. This promotes the growing role of new 
players from the information technology (IT) sector accompanied by new forms of 
organization of the entire value chain. Intermediaries (Simon et al. 2015) and industrial 
partnerships are emerging in the cinema industry in the wake of the digital revolution. These 
new forms of relationship are not solely linked to economic dynamics; they are also the result 
of the evolution of technological infrastructure in the digital age (Henfridsson and Bygstad 
2013). These developments are reflected in original new models of innovation, poorly 
documented in the literature8 but well worth highlighting because they seem to include all 
types of innovation. Furthermore, the issue of the appropriation of digital technologies is all 
the more important as, in the digital age, most of the observed changes seem to be driven by 
new actors emerging outside the traditional sectors, while the traditional players in these 
industries are investing less in R&D and technology. 
 
 
1.1 The Cinema Industry and Innovation in the Academic Literature 
 
Among CCIs, cinema was one of the first to emerge (its seminal economic model was 
established early, at the very beginning of the 20th century). Additionally, it is far from being 
only a market supported by movie theatres that release films on large, wide screens (Silver 
and McDonnell 2007) or exhibiting the “quintessential creative process” (Gil and Spiller 
2007, 248). The success of cinema depends on its ability to use technology to organize itself 
as a service, on a rental basis, for copies to be released in theatres and for viewers to pay an 
admission fee (“renting their seats”). As a consequence, historically, the cinema industry was 
structured around three very different poles in terms of investment and business models: 
production (developing feature films), distribution (supporting logistics for circulating copies 
and providing financial intermediation to collect revenues from tickets) and exhibition (using 
a network of screens). Notwithstanding this seminal role, few studies have focused on the 
evolution strategy of the cinema and – as is the case for CCIs in general (Granados et al. 
2017; Protogerou et al. 2017) – even less on its technological and innovative aspects, even 
though “technology had been the source of competitive advantage” (Ghertman and Hadida 
2005, 59). Rather, the literature has focused on such issues as the implications of market 
signalling for the cinema industry in terms of box-office performance (Akdeniz and Talay 
2013), the comparative influence of institutional assets in the French and US industries 
(Ghertman and Hadida 2005), historical evolution at the country level (for France, see 
Benghozi 1989; Benghozi and Delage 2000), the distribution networks of Hollywood firms in 
the international film industry (Shin and Chiu 2016) or cultural diversity9 in the film industry 
(Moreau and Peltier 2004). In general, the cinema industry has been investigated from the 
perspective of supply and demand more than that of technological impact. For instance, 
Cartier and Liarte (2012) investigate the different periods used to release Hollywood films 
and the appropriateness of release dates in terms of the underlying demand. 
In one of the few contributions examining the issue of innovation in the cinema 
industry, Silver and McDonnell (2007) analyze the impact of new technologies on film 
attendance, in particular that of the substitutes to film attendance in US theatres subsequent to 
the diffusion of radical innovations such as radio and television. These authors also highlight 
some impacts that might now appear secondary, such as the threat to movie theatres posed by 
the home cinema industry through large-screen televisions and the availability of broadband 
and video on demand. In the 1950s, the introduction of the innovative wide-screen Cinerama 
was the main response to the competition brought by television. The more cost-effective 
CinemaScope appeared a little later as one of the industry’s responses to the growing success 
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of television, differentiating itself through the offer of an alternative consumer experience. 
The catch-up model of Bollywood combines the new distribution technologies with 
improvements in quality. UFO Moviez, a pioneer in digital cinema distribution, exemplifies 
the revitalization of the Indian film industry. This film technology company has developed a 
3D-compliant technology that has been deployed across India (see Table 1). Silver and 
McDonnell (2007) also argue that the cinema industry has avoided differentiation strategies 
and has opted for a one-size-fits-all approach to customers. This industry now faces the 
disruptive consequences of the digital revolution. 
 
  
1.2 Differentiated Reactions to Disruptions in the Cinema Industry 
 
The ability to innovate and mobilize new technologies in complex and dynamic environments 
is an important strategic resource in all cultural sectors, as Bhansing et al. (2017) claim in 
their analysis of the performing arts sector. Yet it is well known that the music industry was 
one of the CCIs most destabilized by the Internet revolution (Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-
Garçia 2016). Moreau (2013) analyzes the disruptive nature of digitization with respect to the 
recorded music industry and demonstrates the confrontational reaction of the major players, 
which exemplifies the behaviour of companies facing disruptive innovation. The economic 
disruption caused by digital innovation was supported by the non-rivalry and non-
excludability characteristics of digital content. The challenge that digitization posed to the 
traditional music industry business model was perceived more as a threat than as an 
opportunity, requiring the overcoming of inertia and a radical rethinking of existing business 
models. This explains the delay, on the part of major companies, in adapting to digitization 
and in facing the threat by radical business models to decimate the revenues of incumbents by 
exploiting the advantages of new technologies. Streaming, consumption on demand, new 
actors such as Netflix, the internationalization of content and services: all these factors helped 
to move value along the chain to ride up towards production and ownership and video 
content. This movement has led to talk about a “strategy of convergence,” namely “the 
complementary design linking the content and access industries” (Curien and Moreau 2007, 
162), as access providers are increasingly interested in content. 
Since the seminal contribution of Christensen (1997) regarding the theory of 
disruptive technologies, many studies have examined aspects linked to this theory and that of 
disruptive innovation, in order to determine the disruptive impact on incumbents of the 
business model arising from the new technologies (Hopp et al. 2018). The concept can be 
defined as follows: “the term ‘disruption’ delineates a process in which new entrants with 
generally fewer resources challenge incumbent firms” (Hopp et al. 2018, 446). Moreau (2013) 
provides a detailed review of the theory of disruption by applying it to the music industry, 
where digitization has challenged the CCI business model. Furthermore, the Journal of 
Product Innovation Management published a special issue in 2006 titled Dialogue on the 
Effects of Disruptive Technology on Firms and Industries (Danneels 2006) and a virtual 
special issue in 201810 tracking the evolution and transformation of the concept. Markides 
(2006) focuses on two specific types of disruption: business-model innovation and radical 
product innovation. The former is defined as a new and different business model in an 
existing business, one that can enlarge the market by capturing new customers or encouraging 
existing ones to consume more. Markides (2006) argues that “business model innovators do 
not discover new products or services; they simply redefine what an existing product or 
service is and how it is provided to the customer” (p. 20). This aligns with the strategy of 
Netflix: redefining how content is provided to customers, which implies a new value chain 
structure. Disruptive business-model innovations do not completely overtake and replace the 
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traditional way of doing business; in other words, the cinema industry will not disappear, but 
it has to reinvent itself. 
 
2. From Fringe to Core: IT-Supported Models and the Case of Netflix  
The example of Gaumont Pathé11 in France illustrates how difficult it is for incumbents to 
develop a coherent and proactive strategy vis-à-vis the new opportunities brought by online 
services. The initiatives of this chain of movie theatres include both exploration strategies 
(e.g., digital projection, automated ticketing) and the dynamics of slowing down new offers 
appearing online (e.g., intellectual property rights tariffs, media chronology). The main thrust 
of the reaction of movie theatres facing the Internet challenge has been incremental 
innovations such as significantly improving the quality of screenings and audience comfort 
while maintaining the distribution structure and value chain. The strategy of the industry is, in 
this case, parallel to that adopted in the 1950s, with little success, by developing Cinemascope 
and colour to counter the equally disruptive emergence of television. 
Today, the high-quality strategy adopted by Gaumont Pathé builds on client 
relationships, theatre armchairs, new projection techniques, and staff training. The goal is to 
provide a new and memorable experience (Pine and Gilmore 1998) through larger screens, 
immersive and more powerful sound, armchairs that move and are more comfortable – in 
short, an “immersive cinema experience” using the latest innovative technologies. 
Implementation of this strategy calls for partnerships with external actors. Unforgettable 
effects, non-reproducible at home, and very large screens linked to very high-quality sound 
and images are the main objectives of supplying movies in theatres. Also, the range of 
services offered in theatres extends beyond the simple film-viewing experience; theatres are 
becoming places where people can meet before and after seeing the film for complementary 
activities, with impacts on the value chain. The dematerialization of ticket buying (e-
ticketing) and fidelity cards with subscription formulas are part of the strategy. Targeting is 
thus improved for promotional offers, because this system enables firms to collect data on 
movie consumers, just as Netflix does through its algorithmic formula (see below). 
Over and above marginalist responses such as that of Gaumont Pathé, CCIs have to 
reinvent themselves in response to the transformations brought about by digital technologies 
(Mangematin et al. 2014). A cross-comparison of several CCIs12 shows that tech-supported 
newcomers are challenging legacy players through disruptive proposals such as original 
products, online and mobile channels of distribution, experimental business models, social 
media, and data analytics. These young companies have the capacity to use technology to 
create value by accessing a massive global audience. They offer unprecedented solutions for 
aggregating and distributing content, designing original ways of marketing and new types of 
transaction – for example, free subscriptions, micro-payments and premium services. One part 
of the value is based on the monetization of consumption forms. Another part is based on the 
ability to reduce the costs of production and distribution structures using crowdsourcing, 3D, 
virtualization or digital distribution. The issue is that these new forms of value creation and 
competitive positioning actually compete with older modes based essentially on the creation 
of content with new aesthetics. 
 
 
2.1 Integrating Production and Distribution Offerings: The Disruptive Revolution Brought 
About by Netflix in the Legacy Value Chain 
 
Netflix (see Table 1) is a good example of the digitization revolution. The company has 
extended its relationship with customers by instrumenting its apps to detect consumers’ 
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preferences. Netflix was established in 1997 as an online alternative to DVD movie rentals. 
The success of this niche business was supported by an innovative business model to address 
the problem of late fees for rentals and by an innovative algorithm to enhance customer 
experience through recommendation processes. The innovation brought about by Netflix 
involves the role of new segments of the value chain compared to a legacy value chain of just 
four segments: creation/production rights, aggregator/publisher, distribution, and consumption 
(see Figure 1). Netflix is making the most of the new segments brought about by digitization: 
it has introduced enabling technology services (new ways of billing and paying are important 
components as well) and connectivity (core network, interchange, retail Internet access). 
Partnerships with consumer electronics companies are also an important feature, as devices 
are proliferating. This case study also illustrates jumping from an upstream segment of the 
value chain when building a delivery network to a downstream one, with involvement not 
only in aggregation but also in content production. This feature illustrates the potential role of 
digital platforms in setting up a new balance between available brand content and original 
content. 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Netflix was the first company to recognize that consumers like to view content when 
and where they want. Hence, its streaming format represented a threat to the traditional 
television business model. Netflix captures revenues directly through owning end users 
(Thompson 2017). Its video-on-demand platform has overwhelmed traditional television 
players: it offers television products to consumers directly, and these products are 
personalized using the data collected, which allows Netflix to target programs and advertising 
because it knows what consumers have been watching, where they are, and when they stop 
watching a movie. Netflix uses this information to offer recommendations and content to its 
target customers (Wessel et al. 2016). Predicting what customers will want to watch next is 
the primary goal of Netflix’s data collection strategy. 
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) argue that the development of disruptive innovations 
is linked to a high level of risk and requires experimentation: lack of knowledge about new 
customer needs could be one of the main reasons for failure. In the case of a new actor like 
Netflix, this potential failure has been avoided due to the algorithm originally developed by 
the company to collect data on consumers and then offer them ad hoc programs in accordance 
with their preferences. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) even suggest that “an adhocracy 
culture promotes the development of disruptive innovations in an organization” (p. 17). The 
adhocracy culture (Waterman 1993) of flexibility, creativity, openness, risk-taking and 
dynamism fits well with the strategy adopted by Netflix. 
However, this network activity of transforming customer relationships brings about 
changes in the value chain (Wessel et al. 2016). Software alone is not enough. In the broader 
telecom, media and IT ecosystem perspective, technological intermediaries and economic 
actors supporting and supported by technologies, such as Google, Amazon, Apple and other 
Internet service providers (ISPs), dominate. This observation may signify that innovation is 
largely left to these challengers, who may radically disrupt the traditional industry 
orientations. These new players display specific value networks, including numerous 
technical intermediaries, in contrast with previous linear value chains. Thus, the value chain 
has been dramatically altered and is becoming increasingly more complex. 
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2.2 Challenging the Boundaries: The Emergence of Specialized Technological Suppliers 
 
Investigating the cinema industry sheds some additional light on the revolution brought about 
by digitization. In addition to the disruptive changes at the distribution level that are observed 
in most content industries, incremental technological innovation in the cinema industry has 
been facilitated by original models of innovation at the production level. These models are 
based on particular forms of collaboration that are formalized through the decisive role of new 
intermediaries.13 These new players, usually STSs, establish their position by using their 
expertise to serve the creative dimension of cultural works. New mediations are emerging, as 
revealed by the explicit responsibilities of a new role, that of supervising technical director 
who liaises between the core filmmaking team and the technical IT crews. In the case of 
Dreamworks, for instance (see Table 1), the core filmmaking team for specific endeavours 
includes directors, producers, production designers and visual effects (VFX) supervisors. The 
supervising technical director manages all the technology (software and hardware) for a 
feature film and defines the workflow and the process itself. This middleperson reports to the 
core team. 
Several case studies14 demonstrate the growing role played by these specialized IT 
companies (see Table 1). Analysis of some of these companies and “iconic” clusters 
illustrates their place and their role in the economy of the sector: the nature of the 
collaboration at different levels of the value chain (from the production stage to the exhibition 
stage), the strategy for capitalizing on competitive resources from mastering technologies 
(equipment, patents and know-how), the investment economy (risk-sharing and allocation of 
the created value), the convergence with nearby sectors, such as videogames, using 
multimedia developments and online distribution. From this point of view, the case of 
videogames, one of the CCIs born as digital, is an interesting counterpoint to prefigure some 
of the changes that threaten to reach the cinema. Game studios are constantly developing 
technological innovations and updating their business model to deal with the consequences of 
the digital revolution (Parmentier and Picq 2016). Le et al. (2013) show that in industries such 
as cinema and videogames, technology is central to the creative process, while Gandia (2013) 
details the similarity of the innovation processes of these two industries. 
In the field of cinema, therefore, many high-tech companies have emerged and 
survived, which entails, to some extent, a renewal of the technical cinema industries of the 
past. These new STSs are medium-sized companies. They have mastered ICT skills overall 
but are active in only a small number of technical areas. Their growth model places an 
emphasis on specific operations – rather unusual in the cinema industry – such as the 
management of assets, patenting and innovative technological spillover to other industries. 
 
 
3. The Changing Structure of the Industry: From Project-Based to Business- Based 
 
Innovation models, brought in by these industrial technology intermediaries, offer an 
opportunity for change in the culture of the cinema sector. Cinema is a prototype industry 
based on the production of films. Due to the uncertainty and risk of the film industry, 
production used to be highly organized by intermediaries according to filming activities, 
producer choices, staff status and compensation terms through short-term contracts for single 
films (Faulkner and Anderson 1987).15 However, the cinema industry model is currently 
evolving from this project-based organization (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Foster et al. 
2015; Granados et al. 2017), its core model since the 1940s (i.e., focusing on film production 
through a temporary team that is disbanded once production is finished), to a business-based 
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model in which R&D, technological accumulation and firms organized in an industrial 
ecosystem operate via technology companies, though these are financed mainly by the film 
production budget. 
 
 
3.1 Two Complementary Structuring Formats 
 
Technological innovation in the production stage in a business-based model rebalances 
internal relations within the sector. It redefines the competitive conditions, reorganizes value 
chains, and challenges the domination (mainly by large IT companies) of the distribution 
networks for the benefit of stakeholders at the production stage (the content producers). What 
may be of significance is that both the upstream and the downstream stages are actively 
transforming themselves rather than submitting to the unilateral dominance of one or the 
other. In addition, this technology-oriented shift may offer a move away from stranded 
investments in tailor-made but non-reusable technologies. 
Finally, because of the rapidly changing technological environment, the balance 
between the two complementary conceptions of the industry – technological innovation and 
artistic creation – is evolving towards a more technological orientation, both in production 
and in distribution. Historically, the weight of the creative dimension and the absence of fixed 
production costs gave the market power to producers: they had the ability to raise funds for 
films by mobilizing several contributors and co-producers. Conversely, the weight of the 
technological dimension presupposes investment of another kind, taking place upstream and 
independently of the production of a given project. Hence, the technological dimension shifts 
the centre of gravity of the value chain by giving leadership and market power to the actors 
controlling this dimension, even if, like Netflix or Amazon, they are then compelled to invest 
in production. 
Netflix, as a business-oriented service provider, can manage film projects like an 
innovation flow in traditional companies, giving freedom and autonomy to the teams 
(McCord 2014). Greater artistic freedom is left to creators, and the teams are empowered to 
give the green light to projects. Conversely, with a project orientation, the studio is very 
dependent upon each film and is partly organized around it, which induces stronger directivity 
on the part of studio managers but also a lack of coherence related to the addition of projects. 
 
 
3.2 Incremental or Disruptive Patterns? 
 
Several tensions, therefore, structure the new organization of the cinema value chain. On the 
one hand, newcomers are introducing and mandating their own standards and business 
culture; in terms of film distribution, they are replacing the incumbents and imposing their 
rules on content producers. These IT companies are using technological resources in original 
ways – completely differently from traditional content industries. Instead of merely enhancing 
the legacy content production process, user interfaces or distribution channels, they are 
building their strategy around their activities and ICT-enabled services, where content may 
not be the prime focus. This phenomenon is illustrated by the case of Apple, where revenues 
from devices dominate (Simon 2016) although the company clearly benefits from the 
attractiveness of content to sell its products (the network effect). 
On the other hand, an incremental innovation model has emerged. Specialized ICT 
industry suppliers are building mutually beneficial collaborative relationships with the cinema 
industry at the production stage, promoting a relationship based on an “art meets science” 
model. In addition, the relationship between production and distribution is challenged by the 
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growing value given by the organization of demand and the structuring of consumer 
contributions. These new configurations are also grounded in the algorithmic economy (Hopp 
et al. 2018). On the one hand, it transforms customer relations management through 
prescription and recommendation processes. On the other hand, it encourages customer 
commitment and therefore acts as a driver for crowdsourcing. The new tools thus interact 
with the three historical streams of the cinema industry: production, distribution and 
exhibition. 
 
 
3.3 Redesigning the Structure of the Industry 
 
New relationships between new players and legacy actors are enacted through these different 
trends, which are contradictory but also mutually reinforcing. First, new forms of dominance 
have been brought in by the new players at the distribution/exhibition stage (downstream 
domination). Second, technological innovation has been generated by new forms of 
collaboration between the cinema industry and specialized technology providers at the 
production stage (upstream domination). Third, there has been a shift in media consumption 
from push to pull, which creates tension between the logic of prototype (a film) firmly rooted 
in this industry and the growing momentum for a logic of demand. 
We observe a simultaneous modification of the economic centre of gravity 
(technology leadership, economic weight, investments) and of the hierarchy of the various 
layers in the value chain (initiative, exclusion, choice of distribution channels). Because of the 
fast-changing technological environment, the balance between the two complementary 
conceptions of the industry – technological innovation and artistic creation – is evolving 
towards a more technology-oriented vision, both in production and in distribution. These 
tensions and the reorganization of the value chain lead to sidestepping the issue of the place of 
innovation or R&D in order to examine the role played by the technological infrastructure.  
 
 
4. Technology: From Externalization to Intermediation and Embeddedness in Creation 
Processes and New Relations Between Players  
 
Each film is a prototype and its production is project-driven; different players in the value 
chain need to be brought in for collaboration. In this project-driven prototype industry, the 
focus of production is usually at the creation stage during a single, non-reproducible 
experience, tilted towards the artistic dimension. Yet the various kinds of technology-based 
innovation in the movie industry support alternative development models for film production, 
giving a wider space to R&D by reducing the part of the artistic dimension. Digitization, 
combined with the growing related role of software and computer science during pre-
production (previsualization), production (comprehensive computer-based film editing 
systems), and post-production (visual effects-VFX), has induced relationships within the 
various contributors of “art worlds” (Becker 1982) to evolve in a twofold perspective. First, 
new members and contributors are given space due to their control of and leadership role in 
technology; second, the relations and market power of the incumbents and usual contributors 
are rebalanced and transformed. Developing movies is a structured and managed activity, 
bringing different kinds of resources together and taking a project management approach. 
There are specific opportunities for innovation, but these are difficult to capitalize on due to 
the lack of financial resources and the continuity of an industrial process that only large 
companies can monitor. 
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A comparative analysis of different film technology companies shows an interesting 
variety of situations regarding the types of technical skills and investment structures and the 
nature of their service offer and their positioning in the value chain (see Table 1). R&D 
expenditures are unevenly distributed within the three different layers of technology, the 
media and the telecom ecosystem. R&D is conducted primarily by equipment and service 
providers and IT companies; technology providers such as Akamai16 and Avid17 are the most 
R&D-intensive players. In sharp contrast, the level of expenditure in the content sector, at 
least by the large firms,18 remains very low. 
 
 
4.1 Technology Structuring New Spaces for Interchange and Relations  
 
According to Camors et al. (2006), the decrease in the cost of hardware and software has 
triggered the creation of small companies operating in the special effects subsector.19 
Livingstone and Hope (2011) forecast growth in the United Kingdom, led by the videogame 
and visual effects industries, “where creativity meets high-tech,” as they put it, or, to quote 
Dreamworks, “where arts meet technology” (p. 18). These “Encounters of the Third Kind” 
create new spaces of cooperation and coordination in the film production stream and 
introduce new intermediaries, such as the supervisory technical director. In other words, the 
development of “proprietary” software tools is a process of constant collaboration and 
remains under artistic guidance. At the same time, this symbiosis seems to reveal ways to 
move beyond one of the weaknesses of film as a prototype, namely an inability to capitalize 
on some of the technical achievements of film. It would seem that new technologies 
contribute to reconciling the two visions of cinema, one technical and one artistic, or to 
widening the gulf between them. 
These highly specialized high-tech firms undertake product development and product 
innovation on behalf of clients, which resembles formalized R&D. The growing importance 
of R&D may bring the cinema industry closer to more standard forms of innovation, built on 
the accumulation of R&D and the ability to reuse/reproduce the same innovation for other 
projects. This new perspective leads companies to file patents in ever more distant fields, such 
as optical imagery for Image Metrics (see Table 1). 
Digitization has enabled the technical segment of the cinema industry, previously seen 
as the weak link in the value chain, to flourish anew, and new start-ups have proliferated due 
to the decreasing cost of complex production tools (special effects). In the United Kingdom 
and in New Zealand, this technical element has become the research branch of the film 
industry, guided by the artistic brief but going beyond the part it used to play in the project 
management of a film and beyond the film as a single but ephemeral laboratory. This new 
approach involves significant R&D expenditure. This pivotal role of technology was 
anticipated in the 1970s by pioneers such as Trumbull, who founded their own companies 
with the financial support of large studios (e.g., Paramount and MGM). Zoetrope (see Table 
1) created its own enabling ecosystem, just as Netflix did around its connected device. Wessel 
et al. (2016) show that Netflix looked for new ecosystem partners in order to monitor 
everything its customers do; BBC, Amazon, Apple and Google are some examples. 
However, the technical industries have also been described, in the case of France, as a 
stagnating link in an expanding value chain (Imaginove 2014). The lack of symbiosis between 
filmmakers and technical industries may offer an explanation for the difficulties the subsector 
is facing, as leading firms such as Éclair and Technicolor (see Table 1) are on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The issue may turn out to be a horizontal linkage weakness, as investing in a new 
technology for a film without monitoring the potential technology spinoff or by-products may 
create stranded assets. The leading firms in the United Kingdom and New Zealand appear to 
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have been able to overcome this hindrance. The rebirth of this segment in Britain is especially 
noteworthy since the British cinema almost disappeared in the 1950s, when the leading film 
company, Rank, decided to exit the film business and enter the IT business (at that time, 
largely concerned with copying machines) to become Rank Xerox. Digitization is bringing 
this industry back to life, and the cases reviewed in Table 1 suggest that growth is based on a 
market approach rather than on public subsidies or public management of the funds. 
 
 
4.2 Reconfiguration of the Business Ecosystem and Value Chain and the Growing Role of 
Demand 
 
In the cinema industry, as in all other CCIs, legacy players seem reluctant to embrace the 
changes, a reaction often linked to the weight of their legacy business models even though 
their revenues are declining, as in newspaper publishing (Benghozi and Lyubareva 2014), 
book publishing (Benghozi and Salvador 2016) and music recording (Blanc and Huault 2014; 
Moyon and Lecocq 2015). Despite the fact that, historically, each new technology did bring 
new streams or revenues (e.g., broadcasting, cable, pay TV, DVD), legacy players often fail to 
recognize the opportunities that are opening up. 
Meanwhile, the cinema industry is witnessing the emergence of a new digital 
ecosystem and a new allocation of tasks, centred on the important role played by the 
computing and software activities of the new intermediaries. Smaller or independent sector 
players are seizing the opportunity to achieve more competitive positions in the value chain 
network. They are developing new forms of cooperation. Such specific industrial partnerships 
may be conceived of not in the traditional sense but, rather, as a set of industrial relations of 
“networked collaborators” within an ecosystem. As Benghozi and Salvador (2014) put it, “a 
new vision of partnerships and innovative forms of contract need to be conceived in order to 
support a process involving research-based firms, with specific characteristics and needs, and 
where partners emerge usually ex-post” (p. 49). Yet, considering the creative specificity of 
CCIs, technological strategic partnerships are not simply traditional relations with identified 
industrial partners but are also influenced and shaped by artistic cooperation, thereby 
contributing specifically to the rearrangement of the business ecosystem. 
The successful cases of Akamai (United States), Avid (United States), Weta Digital 
(New Zealand), Double Negative (United Kingdom), UFO Moviez (India) and Ymagis 
(France) (see Table 1) have also been characterized by their global approach from the 
inception stage. At the turn of the 19th century, the leading cinema companies were French 
(Éclair, Gaumont, Lumière), before Hollywood took over. Now, India is the world’s largest 
film producer, with innovative ICT companies (Prime Focus, Reliance, UFO Moviez). 
Digitization is clearly modifying the scope and pace of the globalization process. Today’s 
intermediaries indicate some potential routes to that end that may make it possible to mix 
short-term projects and long-term sustainability. 
The case of book publishing (Benghozi and Salvador 2016) indicates that adapting to 
the digital age may require legacy players to develop more proactive investment strategies to 
deal with the challenge from their powerful new competitors. Going beyond the limitations of 
the “film as a laboratory” model brings benefits and enables third parties to add their 
experience and technical achievements. Nonetheless, the newcomers – new intermediaries 
(including new distributors) – are less susceptible to the “command and control” mode once 
exerted by the production segment. The investments required to produce legacy media 
products must include investment in software solutions and in qualified staff for the digital 
age. 
The new configurations require new strategies and new ways to build competitive 
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positions. Media consumption is shifting from push to pull. A larger number of distribution 
channels, combined with the potential to directly address the public, have reinforced the need 
to pay attention to audience reach/demand/distribution. In this new environment, demand is 
crucial. According to Gubbins (2014), “demand has become much more demanding” (p. 10), 
while the “film industry remains wedded to a ‘push’ model” (p. 35). Gubbins (2014) also 
argues that “progress depends on audiences, and the current value chain and industry practices 
create a barrier, where [they] should provide a gate” (p. 126). IT companies can meet the 
needs of consumers by offering more options for audiences to view content. IT companies use 
technological resources in ways that are original, completely different from those used by 
most CCIs. Instead of merely enhancing the legacy production process of content, user 
interfaces or distribution channels, they build their strategy around their activities and ICT-
enabled services. 
  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions: New Models Disrupting Legacy Policies  
 
Though the digitization of CCIs has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years, the 
way that these industries appropriate digital technologies and the consequences for value 
chain organization remain under-investigated. To our knowledge, no studies have investigated 
the micro-level transformations induced by the digital revolution on the value chain and 
organization of a specific CCI. The present article is one of the first attempts at filling this gap 
in terms of one of the strongest technology-based CCIs, namely the cinema industry. 
Historically, cinema has undergone successive waves of technical innovation, such as 
the introduction of sound and colour (Benghozi and Delage 2000). Emblematically and 
illustratively for CCIs, the cinema industry remains an intensive user of technology, 
incorporating a variety of innovations, with the support of a creative organizational meeting 
of “soft” and “hard” components, and therefore developing strong relations with R&D-
intensive technology suppliers. Furthermore, the cinema industry, like other CCIs, is 
characterized by the ability (and the necessity) to continuously offer consumers new 
“creative” products; to this end, networks and alliances with external actors are necessary. 
Markides (2006) has even suggested the need to import the work organization of creative 
industries to other industries. 
In this fundamentally global context, the legacy media industries in the European 
Union, regardless of their relative strengths, are fragmented and in no position to make the 
best of their own strengths. They are followers, not trendsetters. Tellis (2006) claims that 
incumbents are disrupted not because of emergent technological innovation but because of 
their lack of vision in terms of the mass market and their unwillingness to revolutionize their 
organization to comply with a changed context. Developing the competencies required to deal 
with the arrival of disruptive innovation calls for ambidexterity and an ability to overcome the 
competency traps (Danneels 2006) and myopia of the incumbents (Hopp et al. 2018). 
To take into account the new parameters of the digital environment, policy-makers 
need to move beyond simply supporting supply and production. One consequence of the 
competing distribution models of movies on digital platforms and in theatres is that the 
traditional media chronology (successive release according to channels) is questioned. Films 
produced by Netflix should, for instance, be expected to be available online only after 30 
months instead of being simultaneously released in movie theatres and on Internet platforms; 
this is why the industry lobbied the Cannes film festival to prevent their selection and 
presentation at the 2018 festival. 
A departure from “silo thinking” is thus required to move away from partitioning 
  
13 
 
industrial policies and from any automatic funding mechanism. At the same time, the new 
parameters make it more difficult to identify the level at which any appropriate policy should 
be implemented. Should public intervention target the layer level within the ecosystem? Or 
should direct support be given to the sector level or a blend of sectors, to economic players or 
to specific players (i.e., SMEs, start-ups, middle-range film production, independent 
producers)? 
We need to rethink the traditional frameworks of the economic analysis of culture, 
because the digital world is free from many constraints of the standard economic theory of 
culture. The digital economy is a fixed-cost industry (importance of network effects, low 
marginal costs) for infrastructures and digital services. It gives pivotal economic power to the 
leaders, it generates “natural” monopolies of actors and platforms controlling technology and 
infrastructures, it calls for massive investment because only the leaders survive, and it causes 
competitive problems because of the acquisition of dominant positions in global ecosystems 
of associated markets or neighbours. 
A simple lesson can be drawn from the case studies listed in Table 1: the field is now 
swarming with STSs that are likely to have escaped any policy radar. Therefore, the real 
question is whether there is a need for policy. In any case, maintaining a vertical approach, 
“per industry,” is bound to miss the point: STSs are providing services across the layers of the 
ecosystem and across the boundaries of established industries. The emergence of newcomers 
or intermediaries suggests an irreversible structural change where incumbents in the cinema 
industry (or other CCIs) will have to learn to live together with the new players in an 
ecosystem where all actors can find their place and capture customers using ad hoc 
competitive strategies. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. This article is a follow-up to Benghozi et al. (2015). 
2. For example, Confederation of British Industry 2014; Davy 2007; Foundation for Research, 
Science and Technology 2003; HKU 2010; KEA 2006; Roxane 2014; Santagata 2009; SGS 
Economics and Planning 2013; UNCTAD 2010. 
3. See, for example, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation –  
Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries: An International Perspective (2005); 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change – Digital Technology and the Creative 
Industries: Disassembly and Reassembly (2014); International Journal of Arts Management: 
Financing Creativity: New Issues and New Approaches (2014); Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change: The Creative Economy in Global Competition (2015); Regional Studies: 
Intermediaries and the Creative Economy (2015); Journal of Education and Work: Creative 
Graduate Pathways Within and Beyond the Creative Industries (2015); International Journal 
of Cultural and Creative Industries: Creative Industries Policy in Asia: Innovating Within 
Constraints (2017); Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society: Digital Cultural Policies 
in Comparison (2017). 
4. See the attempt of the ESSnet-Culture framework. The concept of CCIs, used in various 
documents, is not standardized. See Eurostat: 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00126.htm 
5. For a review of the literature on “hidden” innovation and R&D activities in CCIs, see 
Benghozi and Salvador (2016). 
6. The segment includes the following: shooting (manufacturers’ equipment and film, 
shooting rentals, shooting studios/sets, mobile production units); post-production 
(photochemical/digital/video labs, post-production image and sound, dubbing and subtitling); 
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distribution (screening and broadcasting, duplications, prints/KDM, DVD); archiving; 
storage; and restoration.  
7. For instance, two workshops were specifically set up to advance and validate the first 
hypotheses: (1) IPTS International Experts Validation Workshop, “Models of innovation in 
the Creative and Content Industries: Inspiring Insights From the Cinema Industry. Results of 
the CRG Ecole Polytechnique Study and Policy Implications,” Seville, 7 November 2014: 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EURIPIDIS/NRDICCIWorkshop.htm; (2) 
CEPS/IPTS NRDI Workshop, Brussels, 23 March 2015. For details, see Benghozi et al. 
(2015). 
8. For example, De Bruin (2005) examines the film industry in New Zealand. 
9. “Cultural diversity represents the possibility that consumers have . . . access to a large 
supply of cultural products (in terms of quantity), comprised of diversified segments (in terms 
of genres and geographical origins) of relatively well-balanced sizes. It also represents the 
effective consumption of these numerous and diversified cultural products” (Moreau and 
Peltier 2004, 127). 
10. Journal of Product Innovation Management 35(3). 
11. Pathé 2017 annual report, L’année du Coq (The Year of the Rooster): 
http://www.pathe.com/rapport-annuel. 
12. For book publishing, see Benghozi and Salvador (2016); for videogames and cinema, see 
Gandia (2013) and Le et al. (2013); for the music and newspaper industries, see Benghozi and 
Lyubareva (2014). 
13. For a focus on selected case studies of new intermediaries in the cinema industry through 
a description of their role and position in the IT and media ecosystem, see Simon et al. (2015). 
14. See Benghozi et al. (2015) for a detailed description of these case studies. 
15. This model is similar to the intensive short-term collaborations characterizing the 
organization of festivals (Abfalter et al. 2012). 
16. A content delivery network (CDN): www.akamai.com/html/about/index.html  
17. A digital content-creation solutions provider: www.avid.com/US/about-avid  
18. See Table 1 and Benghozi et al.’s (2015) report on cinema for a comprehensive sample of 
the firms tracked. 
19. The British Film Institute (2013) defines this subsector as follows: “Visual effects activity 
includes, but is not limited to: Pre-visualisation, Concept Design, Data Acquisition (motion 
capture, cyber scans, lidar scanning, set surveys, photogrammetry shoots), Computer 
Generated Images (CGI), Character/Creature Animation, Colour Correction, 2D Compositing, 
3D Animation, 3D Modelling, Digital Intermediate, Virtual Sets/Studios, Digital Matte 
Painting, Lighting and Rendering” (p. 3). 
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Abstract 
Cultural and creative industries (CCIs) are based on a capacity for innovation. Yet recent 
technological dynamics support disruptive ways to devise, deploy and create value from 
innovation. Whereas most of the literature addresses the disruptive changes in consumer 
practices and the business models of CCIs, this study investigates how disruptive technologies 
are challenging the organization and value chain of the cinema industry. Such transformations 
are supported by a multilayered evolution driven by technological middlemen, industrial 
partnerships and information technology infrastructure. First, most of the observed changes 
are driven by actors emerging outside CCIs, while the traditional players in these industries 
are investing less in R&D and technology. Second, these new players, usually specialized 
technological suppliers (STSs), are building their position by using their technological 
expertise to serve the creative dimension of cultural works. The authors make several 
observations about the role of these STSs and that of new industrial partnerships. Last, the 
growing importance of information and communication technologies and of online networks 
ascribes a key role to technological infrastructure and platform leadership. This multilayered 
influence leads to a reconfiguration of the traditional business ecosystem and value chain of 
the cinema industry. It also questions the current role of public intervention. In particular, one 
wonders whether this new environment calls for an alternative policy to the traditional silo 
financing (i.e., partitioning the regulation and financial support for each subsector of CCIs) 
that has thus far dominated. 
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chain 
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TABLE 1 THE CINEMA INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A SNAPSHOT OF 
COMPANIES 
 
Company 
and year 
founded 
Sector Country 
 
Key characteristics 
Akamai 1998 Content 
distribution 
United States Provides services to content providers 
that brings their content closer to the 
customer; leading provider of cloud 
services for delivering, optimizing, and 
securing online content and business 
applications 
Avid 1987 Cinema 
technical 
industries 
United States Specialist in video and audio 
production technology: digital 
nonlinear editing systems, management 
and distribution services 
Double 
Negative 
1997 
Cinema 
technical 
industries 
United 
Kingdom 
One of the world’s largest providers of 
visual effects for film, with facilities in 
London, Mumbai and Vancouver 
Dreamworks 
1994 
Cinema 
producers and 
studios 
United States Producer of “high-quality 
entertainment,” including computer-
generated animated feature films, TV 
specials and series, and live 
entertainment properties; example of a 
firm that combines technology and an 
“artistic” dimension to create animated 
feature films; acquired by Reliance in 
2009 
Image 
Metrics 2000 
Cinema 
technical 
industries and 
videogames 
United 
Kingdom 
A company that focuses on advancing 
consumer applications based on 
computer vision, facial analysis and 
recognition technologies 
Éclair 1907 Cinema 
technical 
industries 
France Pioneer in digital post-production; went 
bankrupt in 2015 and was bought by 
Ymagis 
Netflix 1997 Home 
entertainment 
distribution 
company 
United States Niche provider, initially using an 
antiquated distribution channel (e-mail) 
to send VHS tapes, then DVDs, later 
morphing into a global company; is 
world’s leading online TV network 
Prime Focus 
1999 
Cinema 
technical 
industries 
India Commercial post-production facility 
providing top-tier technology solutions 
(visual effects, 3D conversion and 
animation), with offices in London, 
Los Angeles, Vancouver and New 
York 
Reliance 
Entertainment 
(Reliance 
BIG 
Entertainment 
Pvt. Ltd.) 
2005 
Entertainment 
services 
(Internet, new 
media, film, 
TV)  
India Producer of animated films; also 
operates movie studios, a social 
networking platform for Web and 
mobile, FM radio, online gaming, 
mobile gaming, home video and theme 
parks; provides music, sports, and 
Internet and mobile portals as well as 
user-generated content  
Technicolor 
(formerly 
Thomson) 
2010 
Cinema 
technical 
industries 
France A former equipment manufacturer and 
provider of audiovisual services, 
refocused on core service activities 
after being renamed Technicolor 
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Company 
and year 
founded 
Sector Country 
 
Key characteristics 
UFO Moviez 
2005 
Cinema, digital 
film distribution 
India Delivers films to theatres through 
satellite transmission; is world’s largest 
satellite-based digital cinema network 
Ymagis 
2007 
Cinema 
technical 
industries; 
digital 
distribution 
France Provides funding to help cinema 
exhibitors make the transition from 
35mm to digital projection; provides 
assistance to producers, distributors, 
and exhibitors (encryption, valuation, 
duplication and transport)  
Zoetrope 
1969 
Cinema 
producers and 
studios 
United States A “deviant studio” founded by film 
directors Francis Ford Coppola and 
Geroge Lucas to design and implement 
creative, “unconventional approaches 
to filmmaking” 
Weta Digital 
1993 
Cinema 
technical 
industries 
(VFX) 
New Zealand Provides a suite of digital production 
services for feature films and high-end 
commercials, from concept design to 
cutting-edge 3D animation 
 
Source: company Web sites 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 NEW MEDIA VALUE CHAIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Avid (2014) 
 
